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Technology and International Trade:
Will the Real Transformer Please Stand Up?

1

Todd Weiler†
most challenging of contests between individuals or
between individuals and regulators (the less challenging
are most often settled or otherwise resolved). The legal
resolution of these disputes may bring about a change in
the legal order or they may arise as a result of a change in
the legal order. In either case, they are likely reflective of
a past or impending change in society. In other words,
there is a reason for the dispute — something has effectively changed the status quo ante between the parties,
permitting (or forcing) them to seek a legal resolution to
their dispute. Thus, the study of legal disputes permits
one to make observations concerning the nature and
extent of legal transformation.
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T

he primary driver of change in Canada’s cultural
sector has not been some kind of contrived, neoliberal plot imposed upon an unsuspecting public with
the promise of ‘‘jobs, jobs, jobs.’’ Rather, it has been
technology. The role for liberalised trade and investment
treaties comes only in the form of a conditioning force,
limiting the panoply of choices available to governmental officials who want to respond to the changes
being wrought by technological advances.
This paper begins with some brief definitions,
moving next to an elaboration of its thesis, and finally
explaining the application of this thesis to some selected
case studies.
‘‘Transformation’’ is defined as ‘‘a marked change, as
in appearance or character, usually for the better.’’ 2 Legal
transformation is the phenomenon of change or displacement in the established legal order, often in
response to external stimuli that challenge the underlying policy assumptions upon which that order was
built. Policy is the discourse which takes place among
governing elites concerning the nature or utility of societal changes. Oftentimes, the policy discourse includes a
discussion or alternative means to address the perceived
changes in the ideal social order. These policy choices are
implemented in order to ‘‘fix’’ the perceived problem by
changing behaviour to suit the objectives and goals
chosen beforehand by these elites.
The legal regime exists in order to condition or
modify behaviour, individually or collectively. The legal
regime changes only through the purposive policy
choices of governing elites. It cannot be transformed
through osmosis. By contrast, societal change often
occurs through a process akin to osmosis, although it can
also be brought about by external forces, including the
imposition of, or change in, a legal regime; or through
some other form of external stimuli, such as technological change.
Legal disputes are an excellent vantage point from
which to witness transformation (both in society and in
the governing legal regime). Legal disputes represent the

Treaty regimes such as the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 3 act as an external conditioning force on the way governments regulate. Contrary
to the beliefs of some ardent anti-globalization protestors, treaty regimes do not represent a ‘‘surrender of sovereignty’’; rather, they represent the exercise of sovereignty, whereby democratic governments determine that
it would be in the best interest of their citizens to choose
to refrain from acting in ways that are deleterious to the
well-being of a greater number of people. In other words,
through trade and investment treaties, governments have
agreed to save each other from the prisoner’s dilemma of
discriminatory and arbitrary regulatory conduct, which
— while appealing to a local constituency — has led to
such social and economic catastrophes as the Great
Depression and numerous wars.
To the extent that international obligations constrain (or sometimes compel) regulatory behaviour
which would not have occurred but for their existence,
they can be said to have a transformative effect on
domestic legal regimes. More often than not, however,
governments take reservations in treaties to safeguard
their most sensitive political interests — thus leaving the
remainder of their local regulatory regimes to the disciplines of a new, external regime. And for the most part,
none of those regimes violate the basic tenets of international economic law, such as national treatment 4 (i.e.,
promising to treat the foreigner as well as the local);
most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment 5 (i.e., promising
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to treat the foreigner as well as other foreigners); fair and
equitable treatment 6 (i.e., promising transparency and
due process in governmental decision-making); and the
promise to pay prompt and appropriate compensation
for the taking of property. 7
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With the NAFTA, Canada sought, and obtained,
special treatment for its regulation of cultural industries.
It did not obtain a complete reservation for the sector for
two reasons. First, officials recognised the value of
external constraints and the economic well-being they
bring. Second, the price for complete impunity for the
regulation of an indeterminate group of industries
would have been too high, requiring Canada to liberalize
in many other sensitive political areas for the expense of
a handful of Canadian-owned cultural industry members. Accordingly, the NAFTA Parties agreed to grant to
Canada the same ‘‘cultural industry exemption’’ that it
had obtained in the Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement.
As NAFTA Annex 2106 states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, as
between Canada and the United States, any measure
adopted or maintained with respect to cultural industries,
except as specifically provided in Article 302 (Market Access
— Tariff Elimination), and any measure of equivalent commercial effect taken in response, shall be governed under
this Agreement exclusively in accordance with the provisions of the Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement.
The rights and obligations between Canada and any other
Party with respect to such measures shall be identical to
those applying between Canada and the United States.

Article 2005 of the Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) 8, in turn, provides:
(1) Cultural industries are exempt from the provisions
of this Agreement, except as specifically provided in Article
401 (Tariff Elimination), paragraph 4 of Article 1607 (divestiture of an indirect acquisition) and Articles 2006 and 2007
of this Chapter.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, a Party may take measures of equivalent commercial
effect in response to actions which would have been inconsistent with this Agreement but for paragraph 1.

Accordingly, apart from specific provisions contained within CUSFTA Article 2206 concerning retransmission rights in the cable (and now also satellite) television businesses, some people in Canada believed that it
had taken what appears to have been a very broad reservation for its regulation of cultural industries — providing it with carte blanche to exclude foreigners from
making cultural investments, providing cultural services,
or producing cultural goods. In order to understand how
broad the reservation first appeared to be, one need only
look to the NAFTA Article 2107 definition of ‘‘cultural
industries’’:
cultural industries means persons engaged in any of the
following activities:
(a) the publication, distribution, or sale of books,
magazines, periodicals or newspapers in print or
machine readable form but not including the sole
activity of printing or typesetting any of the foregoing;

(b) the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of
film or video recordings;
(c) the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of
audio or video music recordings;
(d) the publication, distribution or sale of music in
print or machine readable form; or
(e) radiocommunications in which the transmissions
are intended for direct reception by the general
public, and all radio, television and cable broadcasting undertakings and all satellite programming
and broadcast network services[.]

A more careful review at the second paragraph of
CUSFTA Article 2005 reveals, however, that cultural
industries were really not exempted from the NAFTA at
all. Rather than being a cultural reservation or exemption, NAFTA Article 2106 and Annex 2106 represent a
cultural retaliation clause. Canada is free to regulate cultural industries as it sees fit, but if such regulation harms
U.S. or Mexican trade or investment interests, retaliation
is permitted under the NAFTA. While some government
officials appear to have believed such retaliation would
only be imposed after the establishment and conclusion
of a NAFTA Chapter 20 dispute settlement panel, the
truth is that the provision contemplates retaliation as a
first response. If Canada does not believe the retaliation
was warranted on the basis that it was not taken in
response to the regulation of a cultural industry, or if
Canada believes the quantum of the retaliatory measure
exceeds what would be the ‘‘equivalent commercial
effect’’ of its cultural measure, Canada will be forced to
take the matter to a Chapter 20 panel.
Of course, one could note that since CUSFTA
Article 2005 and NAFTA Article 2106 were both drafted
before the advent of the World Wide Web, there appears
to be a yawning gap in the definition of ‘‘cultural industries.’’ The gap would appear to include such applications as video streaming and television ‘‘broadcasts’’ over
IP. In such cases, the regulation of these activities could
be reviewed under any applicable NAFTA services,
investment or intellectual property provision. The result
of a finding of non-compliance, as a practical matter,
would be the potential for economic retaliation,
although it is at least arguable that the demonstration of
a breach of an international law obligation is more likely
than not to result in a change in government policy in
order to conform to the obligation.
The other significant reason that it matters whether
the cultural retaliation clause applies to the regulation of
an alleged cultural industry is the existence of Part B of
NAFTA Chapter 11. This portion of the NAFTA permits
an investor from another NAFTA Party to seek damages
before an international arbitral tribunal for non-compliance with a number of basic trade norms. Awards rendered by these tribunals are enforceable against the
NAFTA Parties using the mechanisms in place in each
country for the enforcement of any commercial arbitral
award. Accordingly, whereas regulation covered under
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the cultural exemption would arguably not be subject to
a claim for compensation, everything else would be fair
game.
In addition to the NAFTA, there are also the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements, 9 which contain
similar kinds of obligations to the NAFTA, but which
may go further than either the NAFTA or its CUSFTA
predecessor would otherwise prohibit. For example, the
WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 10
contains an MFN treatment obligation that covers all
trade in services, subject to specified exemptions. Accordingly, if the Canadian Government adopts a policy that
could be construed as favouring other nationals in a new
way that was not ‘‘grandfathered’’ through a reservation,
claims could be launched by other governments against
Canada for a breach of the GATS MFN obligation
(Article II).
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Given the nature of the NAFTA cultural retaliation
clause, the numerous cultural reservations taken by
Canada in most international treaties, and the basic character of Canada’s WTO and NAFTA obligations, it is
nonetheless fair to say that Canada’s legal regime governing cultural industries — as it stood on the day the
NAFTA and WTO Agreements came into force — has
(and will be) unaffected by the existence of the NAFTA
and the WTO.
That is not the end of the story, however, for there
have been more than a handful of disputes involving
Canada’s regulation of cultural industries over the past
ten years which have resulted in changes to the existing
legal regime. The two cases which will be examined in
this paper are: (1) the ‘‘split run’’ magazine dispute; and
(2) the Amazon.ca dispute. Both cases provide an excellent example of how the primary driver of legal transformation in the cultural sector has been technology, rather
than the conditioning of international trade regimes.
Technological advances lead to changes in human
behaviour, including business models. As the owners of
video tape rental stores are learning, the advent — and
consumer acceptance of — video-on-demand has forced
them to modify or abandon their existing business
models. The same is true of ‘‘record stores’’ (referring to a
format of recording music that has essentially gone the
way of the dinosaur). Record stores and record companies are struggling to come to terms with file-swapping
services that threaten their business model 11 by diversifying product offerings and markedly changing sales and
distribution models. They have also resorted to legal
disputes against file-sharing services and consumers.
As stated above, sometimes technology-driven
changes disrupt the status quo ante upon which the
existing legal regime is based. When this phenomenon
occurs, one can expect to see recourse to legal disputes
by those whose interests have been, are being, and/or
will be affected by technological change. No better
example exists today than the one-two step of music
industry members launching digital-music-on-demand

services (with encryption technologies 12) and dramatically dropping the price of music sold on compact
disks 13, while launching waves of law suits against filesharing companies and those who use them in a manner
that arguably violates the artists’ copyright in their
recordings (as protected in the licenses that implicitly
govern the use of any recording sold to a consumer,
regardless of format).
When the legal regime is forced to change, the time
of the international trade regime is nigh. In short, international economic rules come into play when domestic
legal regimes change, conditioning the policy choices
available to respond to these new tensions. They require
the new measures to be imposed in a transparent and
procedurally fair manner (e.g., NAFTA Article 1105 or
Article X of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
— the ‘‘GATT’’ 14). They require the new measures to not
result in better treatment to one foreigner, or one
domestic economic operator, than other foreigners (e.g.,
NAFTA Articles 1102 and 1103 or GATS Article 11).
They require that the result of the measure cannot be
the effective confiscation of a foreigner’s investment in
Canada (NAFTA Article 1110). Aside from these rules,
governments can respond to technological change in any
way they see fit. As it often turns out, however, the
Government of Canada has not demonstrated a particularly good record of compliance with international obligations.

Split-Run Magazines

S

plit-run magazine publishing is a common publication method in the United States. In a nutshell, the
magazine publisher produces magazines for each
regional market, with a majority of the content shared
and one-tenth to one-quarter directed to different markets. Split run publishing allows Sports Illustrated, for
example, to publish a national magazine that appeals to
Dodger and Lakers fans in Southern California, as well as
Yankee and Rangers fans in metropolitan New York.
The problem for the Canadian government was that
Sports Illustrated could also publish an edition for
Canada for very little added costs, potentially skimming
off revenues from Canadian magazine publishers who
could not take advantage of such economies of scale
because Americans would not be interested in their
magazines. Accordingly, they would be forced to compete with (what was assumed) to a be limited pool of
advertising dollars with an internationally branded
‘‘American’’ magazine whose production costs were limited to the hiring of one or two Canadian reporters and
the contracting-out of actual publication and distribution. To some, this practice represents a form of ‘‘cultural
dumping’’ (analogizing to trade laws that prohibit the
‘‘dumping’’ of goods in a foreign market at a price lower
than their production in the home market).

226

✄ REMOVE

Username: bmorriso

Date: 31-JAN-05

Time: 7:16

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\02_03\weiler.dat

Seq: 4

The Canadian Government has had a long-standing
policy against the publication of American split-run
magazines for the English-Canadian market. While
Canada was forced to repeal its laws banning foreign
production of newspapers in Article 2007 of the
CUSFTA, it did not bargain away its split-run policy
when negotiating the NAFTA, and for a few years, the
U.S. did not retaliate (most likely because no U.S. firm
complained enough about basically being barred from
the Canadian market). Three U.S.-owned periodicals
(most notably Time Canada) had been permitted to
operate in Canada because they were already in business
by the time Canada began to effectively enforce its antiU.S.-split-run policy. It is important to note that none of
Canada’s measures prevented U.S.-origin magazines
without a Canadian-split-run edition from entering the
market. Accordingly as much as 80% of English Canadian newsstands were occupied by U.S.-origin
magazines. Canada’s policy was aimed at protecting the
remaining 20%, and the domestic advertising revenues
that flowed from it (U.S.-origin magazines would obviously contain mostly U.S.-origin advertising, thus not
affecting the Canadian publisher’s share of local revenues).
Canada enforced its split-run policy through three
measures: a prohibitive 80% excise tax on the import of
split-run magazines; a subsidy granted to Canadian publishers to reduce postage costs; and an income tax deduction for advertising in Canadian magazines. In particular,
the 80% excise tax was calculated to prevent Sports Illustrated from entering the Canadian market in 1993. By
1997, the United States was acting on the problem —
and it chose the WTO General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade to challenge these measures. It succeeded in
having the first two measures found in violation of
Canada’s obligation to provide national treatment to
magazine publishers under GATT Article III:4, and
Canada was forced to respond.
At the same time, however, the Canadian Government faced an additional problem: the excise tax could
be completely circumvented by electronically transferring the contents of a magazine to a sub-contracted
Canadian publishing facility — because no magazines
would be imported! Faced with the obligation to adopt
new measures that were GATT-consistent, and knowledgeable of how advances in technology rendered
border measures useless, Canadian officials drafted
Bill C-55, a measure that simply prohibited Canadians
from advertising in U.S. split-run magazines. 15
The idea behind Bill C-55 was that since it was
strictly targeted at advertising services — something that
Canada had never promised in the NAFTA or any WTO
Agreement to honour the national treatment standard
— the measure would protect Canadian publishers as
effectively as had the border measures and postal subsidy
(which could be easily reworked to comply with WTO
obligations without changing the end-result of subsi-
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dized postage). Bill C-55 was completely flawed for three
reasons. First, it would most likely have been found to be
an unnecessary abridgement to the constitutionally protected right of free speech. Second, it would likely have
simply driven advertisers to direct their money to
Internet-based magazines (which were not covered by
the measure); and third, the U.S. was not obliged to go
back to the WTO in order to challenge Canada’s transparent attempt to circumvent its GATT obligations
(which would undoubtedly have been found to affect
trade in goods — i.e., magazines — and thus would have
violated GATT Article III:4 anyway).
Rather than waste any more time in Geneva pursuing WTO remedies, the U.S. merely drafted a list of
goods to which it would soon apply punishing duties.
The retaliation would be specifically targeted at goods
produced in the home town of the Cabinet Minister
responsible for Bill C-55, Sheila Copps. Whereas some
Canadian officials naively thought that NAFTA
Article 2105 would only be invoked by the United States
to receive permission from a trade panel to retaliate
(which would have taken even longer than another trip
to the WTO), the truth was that the NAFTA required no
such thing. It merely stated that measures of equivalent
commercial effect could be imposed in cases where a
Canadian measure was justified under the cultural
industries exemption. Accordingly, it would be up to
Canada to prove: (1) that the retaliation was unjustified
because Bill C-55 was not really a cultural measure; or
that (2) the amount of the retaliation was simply too
high. In the mean time, Madame Copps would have had
to run for re-election in a city potentially devastated as a
direct result of her own actions.
The solution negotiated with the United States permitted any U.S. firm to publish split-runs in Canada,
subject to an agreement to provide a minimum level of
Canadian content which most would arguably have
ended up delivering anyway. In the years that have
passed since the settlement, the magazine publishing
landscape has not dramatically changed in terms of the
production of hard copies, although the content-provider industry has changed dramatically with the advent
of more and more sophisticated IP-based delivery
methods.

Amazon.com

S

afely reserved from both the NAFTA and the GATS,
has been the long-standing Canadian cultural policy
that those who publish, distribute, or sell books in
Canada must be Canadian individuals or firms owned
and controlled by Canadians. This policy is based on the
presumption that a foreign (read: U.S.) book publisher or
retailer would not be interested in selling books by
Canadian authors to Canadians. This policy has been
touted as protecting the ability of Canadian authors to
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get their work published in what would otherwise be
what some have called the ‘‘MacWorld.’’ For all of the
many Canadian authors who have been nominated for,
or awarded, the world’s most prestigious awards (such as
the Booker), or who have appeared on the ultimate ‘‘best
seller list’’ (maintained by the New York Times) it must
seem somewhat galling that Canadian policy-makers
have long believed that the millions of people around
the world who read their work would not have done so
if Canadians did not run the publishing houses and
retail stores from which their books are sought.
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Nonetheless, it must be stressed that under the
NAFTA and WTO, Canada was under no obligation to
alter this policy. Those who would fault international
treaties for the fact that Canadians can today purchase
their books by going to www.amazon.ca would be sadly
mistaken. The reason why www.amazon.ca exists is
because the proprietors of www.amazon.com realized
that a large number of Canadians demonstrated an
interest in purchasing books from them, most likely
because of their business model — which provides more
people with more — and generally less-expensive —
access to the books they want to read than any individual book store (including those run by chains, which
naturally will tend to stock only the most popular titles,
leaving those in search of more obscure publications to
wait for their ‘‘special order’’ to arrive.
The Amazon.ca business model is simple. Orders
are placed on the .ca site, which is maintained on web
servers in the United States. The orders are handled in
extensively the same way that they would be handled if
they had been made through the .com address. Fulfilment of the orders has been contracted-out to a Canadian-owned logistical company, with warehouses in
Canada, and to Canada Post, a crown corporation with a
statutory monopoly to deliver mail, which is owned by
the Government of Canada itself. (That Canada Post has
abused its monopoly position to compete unfairly in the
business of expedited parcel delivery is the subject of an
unrelated NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration launched by
UPS.) The relevant question for Amazon.ca is the legal
regime that governs the publication, distribution and
sale of books in Canada.
It is apparent that Amazon.ca has found a perfect
way of structuring its business model so as to avoid any
contravention of Canada’s investment regime (which
basically prohibits non-Canadian ownership unless the
Minister concludes that it is in the best interests of
Canada to permit it). Amazon.ca does not publish books
anywhere. It does not distribute them in Canada; that
work was contracted out to two Canadian-owned businesses. It does not sell the books in Canada because — as
far as the Government of Canada is concerned — it does
not have any investment in Canada — at all. It has no
subsidiary in Canada. It has no employees in Canada. It
has no Internet infrastructure in Canada. Whereas Amer-
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ican courts have sometimes interpreted U.S. constitutional law in such a way as to assert personal jurisdiction
over Internet-based retailers directing their business
model towards customers in the territorial jurisdiction in
question, Canada has no similar constitutional jurisprudence upon which to draw.
Canadian book publishers, distributors and retailers
have basically enjoyed decades of protection from the
forces of competition that were unleashed by the
NAFTA and WTO Agreements, and which overhauled
so many of Canada’s once-archaic and inefficient industries. All of a sudden, technological change has permitted
their erstwhile competitors to enter the market, and
Canada cannot simply impose new measures upon them
to halt the process. Otherwise, we would witness a repeat
of the split-run magazine story, as Canada has committed to make no new changes to its cultural regimes in
the NAFTA and WTO Agreements. The reservations it
negotiated with other trading partners effectively
‘‘grandfathered’’ these measures — but only in the form
in which they appeared as of the date these treaties came
into force (both in the mid-1990’s).
Partially because Canada’s legislation had not contemplated the kind of B2B e-commerce that permitted
Sports Illustrated to avoid the existing regime, and
because Canada’s legislation had not contemplated the
kind of B2C e-commerce pioneered by companies such
as Amazon, these regimes were left open to the transforming effects of technological change. Fresh from its
failed experiment with modifying its split-run measures
to maintain its split-run policy, the Canadian Government did not attempt to block Amazon.ca. Any attempt
to do so would have been open to challenge under the
services and investment chapters of the NAFTA (particularly the former, but possibly the latter, given the much
broader definition of ‘‘investment’’ found in Article 1139
than could be found in Canada’s investment review
measures).
A legal dispute has nonetheless arisen, however,
which permits us to consider just how technological
change has effectively led to legal transformation. The
heretofore protected giant of Canadian book retailing,
Indigo Books, along with an association of booksellers
normally at odds with it, have banded together in an
attempt to force the Department of Canadian heritage to
do what it arguably cannot do under international trade
rules: keep Amazon.ca out of Canada. Such a result,
albeit unlikely (given the high standard of deference
shown to the discretion of government officials in Canadian administrative law), would undoubtedly enforce
the spirit and goals of the existing regime. Accordingly,
whether these protected companies score an unexpected
upset and compel Canada to violate its international
treaty commitments, or whether they lose, technology
has had a transformative effect on the old legal regime —
it has rendered the regime utterly ineffective.
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Conclusion

W

ith this short paper, I have attempted to demonstrate how legal transformation can be effected by
forces other than international trade and investment
regimes. The legal regime underpinning Canada’s protectionist cultural policies provides compelling proof
that there are other ‘‘culprits’’ for the critics of liberalised
trade to consider. In truth, however, it is far from clear
that the changes in Canadian cultural policy wrought by
technological change are actually a bad thing. As a topic
for further research, one might well consider how technological change has become a force for liberalisation
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and deregulation equal, if not superior, to the external
legal force of international treaties, with all of their
exceptions and reservations for each nation’s sacred cow
(or cattle herd, as the case may be). After all, as the WTO
working groups looking into the impact of e-commerce
on trade rules have noted, technological change can even
have transformative effects on international treaty obligations. In other words, I propose that somebody write a
book entitled: ‘‘Technology: the Primary Agent of Legal
Transformation’’. I will be sure to purchase a copy —
online, of course.
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